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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN V. BENSON and EMILY SUE
BENSON,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Defendants,
and
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN
CO., a corporation,

Case No. 14684

Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
GEORGE P. RUFF,
Third-Party
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
GEORGE P. RUFF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from that portion of the Judgment and Order
of Dismissal entered by the Trial Court on April 22, 1976, wherein
the Court dismissed with prejudice Counts II and III of the ThirdParty Complaint and appeals from an Order of the Trial Court
denying Appellant's Motion to Amend Judgment and Motion for Relief
from Judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A final Order, dismissing with prejudice, the third-party
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

«

Plaintiff-Appellant1s complaint against the third-party defendantrespondent was entered by the Court on March 9, 1976 after the
jury had been impaneledf and the trial had begun, as a consequence of a settlement during trial reached between the
plaintiff and defendant during the noon recess and after the
plaintiff as third-party plaintiff had advised the Court it was

I
not prepared to proceed to trial against the third-party defendant.

Thereafter, on May 5, 1976, third-party plaintiff-

appellant filed a Motion to Amend Judgment and a Motion for
Relief from Judgment*

Following the hearing on the said

Motion to Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment, the
lower court denied third-party plaintiff-appellant's motions,
i
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Trial Courtfs final Order
of Dismissal with prejudice, and the Trial Court's ruling in
denying Appellant's Motion to

Amend Judgment and Motion for

Relief From Judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, Murray First Thrift, (hereinafter MFT) filed
a Complaint against John V. and Emily Sue Benson (hereinafter
Bensons), on November 15, 1974, in the District Court of
Washington County, State of Utah.

^

(R 1. ) The Complaint was based

upon a series of loan transactions between MFT and Bensons.
On January 20, 1975, Bensons filed an Answer and Counterclaim
(R 125-135) and on February 10, 1975, Bensons filed an Amended
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Answer and Digitized
Counterclaim.
( ROCR,
136-138).
Machine-generated
may contain errors. Thereafter, extensive

^

discovery was undertaken by both sides.

Finally, on October

10, 1975, just three and one-half months prior to the original
date set for trial, and 11 months after the case had been original]
filed, MFT filed a third-party Complaint against George Ruff
an individual, as third-party defendant. (R 139-156),
The third-party defendant-respondent, George Ruff, had
worked for MFT in various positions but was fired by MFT in
February 1974.

March 9, 197 6 Proceedingsf p. 28.

At the

time of trial, George Ruff was working as an employee for his
church,

March 9, 1976, Proceedings, p. 22.

Appellant's Third-Party Complaint against George Ruff,
respondent, sought recovery from George Ruff of 1) any funds
MFT may have to pay Bensons on the

Counterclaim by Bensons as

a result of alleged actions by George Ruff, 2) any funds MFT
may be unable to collect from Bensons due to George Ruff's
failure to fulfill and discharge his duties, and 3) conversion
of more than $10,000.00.

(R 139-145.)

Because of MFT's "11th

hour" efforts to involve George Ruff as a third-party defendant,
and with the trial date already set when the third-party complaint
was filed,third-party defendant, Ruff, (hereinafter respondent)
was forced to do a great and burdensome amount of discovery
in a short period of time in order to prove he did not convert
MFT funds to his own use and that all of his actions and conduct
of business were consistent with business practices of appellant
MFT.

Discovery on respondent's part was extremely complex and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

costly as a great deal of accounting work had to be done with
records of the appellant, in addition to collecting and evaluating
numerous documents in the possession of MFT.

March 9, 1976, Pro-

ceedings , p. 11r 33.

At the beginning of the trial with the jury impaneled, an
opening statement by each party to the action was made, whereupon
the court ordered a noon recess.

Upon returning to the courtroom,

respondent learned that during the recess plaintiff-MFT and
defendants-Benson had compromised and settled their claims
against one another.

(R 30-33).

Only after all parties were

in St. George, Utah, and were in trial of the case did MFT and
Bensons discuss settlement.
According to the stipulation read into the record, defendantsBenson agreed to transfer to plaintiff-MFT the apartment complex
which respondent, as employee of MFT, had taken as security for
the various MFT loans to Benson, whereupon the court ordered
dismissal of MFT's Amended Complaint and Benson's Counterclaim.
March 9, 1976 Proceedings, p. 31-35.

MFT as third-party

plaintiff stated to the Court that Count One of the Third Party
Complaint against third party defendant-respondent Ruff was
now moot, and then requested that Counts Two and Three be
dismissed without prejudice stating that MFT will not know ..."
until we have liquidated the Benson property whether, and to
what extent Murray has been injured ... by Mr. Ruff."
1976, Proceedings, p. 33.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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March 9,

At this point, counsel for respondent demanded his day in
court*

The following dialogue took place:
MR. CASSITY (for Respondent-third party defendant -

Ruff): Your Honor, I have almost unbelievable expense because
of the complications, that detail, which the Court hasn't
been subject to, unfortunately, as of this moment.
The third-party defendant, George Ruff, is prepared
to try this case, has spent a considerable amount
of money subpoenaing witnesses out of Salt Lake City,
as well as other areas, and is here prepared to
proceed relative to all claims in these proceedings
against this defendant and we are here and we intend
to go forward and any settlement notwithstanding these
parties we are going to pursue until this matter is either
disposed of by judgment or verdict in this case or by
<#

dismissal with prejudice as to all claims against this
defendant,
THE COURT:

There is no objection to the dismissal;

on the other hand, you claim it should be with prejudice
and not without prejudice?
MR. CASSITY:

I have no objection to any other provision

except in regard to Count 2 and Count 3, as stated by Mr.
Ferrari, where he moves that they be dismissed without
prejudice. I insist on my day in Court and it is here.
THE COURT: And you are ready to go?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i

MR. CASSITY:

I am, sir.

THE COURT:

All right, I will hear you, Mr. Ferrari.

MR. FERRARI:

Well, you Honor,

Count 2 and 3 are

counts, claims for damages resulting from Mr. —

from

Mr. Ruff's wrongful acts in connection with the
Benson trust actions.

We have now through this settlement

^

obtained, or will obtain, title to real property of
indeterminate value.

It is quite possible that the

liquidation of this property will leave us without damages,

^

therefore, to go forward with a claim against Mr. Ruff
at this time

—

THE COURT:

You can't go forward now is what you are

j

saying?
MR. FERRARI:

That is correct.

March 9, 1976 Proceedings, p. 33-34.

•

0

Thus, after 16 months of preparation, arrival of trial date
in St. George, Utah, impaneling of a jury, opening statements
at trial having been made, and "literally minutes before evidence

0

would have been presented to the jury",, (Appellant's Brief, p. 4)
appellant was unwilling to go forward as stated by their own counsel.
No reason was given by appellant counsel why the issue of liability

•

on the second count and the third count could not have been
tried and decided at that time, but for refusal of appellant
to proceed.
Following the order of the court dismissing the ThirdDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Party Complaint
withMachine-generated
prejudice,
the
said, " ... the Court
OCR, may
containCourt
errors.

•

inquired as to your ability to go forward.
for trial.

You indicated you could not.

Court, prepare appropriate pleadings."
p. 35.

This is the time set
That's the ruling of the

March 9, 1976 Proceedings,

Thus, because of appellant's failure and refusal to go

forward at the time of trial, the Judge dismissed the Third-Party
Complaint with prejudice.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
The dismissal with prejudice by the lower court was
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(a)(2) which
provides in part that "an action shall,not be dismissed at the
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." The
vast majority of the Federal Courts interpreting the Federal
equivalent of this rule have held that the trial court is granted
broad discretion

to grant or deny a 41(a)(2) motion

and to impose such conditions as it deems just.
For example, the court in Butler v. Denton, 150 F.2d 687
(10th Cir. 194 5) held;
Under the Rule, the court is vested with a reasonable
discretion in the matter of dismissal after the filing
and service of the answer... And the action of the court
in respect of dismissal will not be disturbed on appeal
unless the discretion has been abused. 150 F.2dr»at 690.
(Emphasis added) «
~
The New Mexico Supreme Court, interpreting an identical
statute, was of the opinion that the decision of the lower
court with respect to voluntary dismissal,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Is a matter of Judicial discretion, the exercise of
which will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence
of clear abuse. (Emphasis added) Emmco Insurance Company
v. Walker, 57 N.M. 525, 260 P.2d 712, (1953).
The record shows the following aspects of the case upon
which the ruling of the court can be justified:
1.

Advanced stage of proceedings.

The farther along in

proceedings that the plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal
is made, the more obligated the court is to deny it. In Paturzo
v. Home Life Ins. Co., 503 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1974), the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals summed up its position as follows:
Furthermore, we found that the denial of a plaintiff's
motion voluntarily to dismiss would not have been an
abuse of discretion, ,fIn view of the advanced stage of the
proceedings." Citing Armstrong v. Frostie Company, 453 F.
2d 914 (4th Cir. 1971) at 916. Likewise, in Young v.
John McShain, Inc., 130 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1942), we
indicated our hesitancy in granting a voluntary dismissal
where the action has progressed to or beyond the trial
stage. Id. at 335 (Emphasis added)
In Shaffer v. Evans, 263 F.2d 135 (10th Cir. 1958),
a District Court had dismissed the plaintiff's case with prejudice
when the plaintiff declined to go forward after its motion for
dismissal without prejudice was denied.

The

Court of Appeals

upheld the lower court's ruling stating:
This action has been pending for some six months at the
time of the hearing of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss.
Depositions had been taken, the defendant had made arrangements for medical testimony, a pre-trial conference
had been held. The case had not been set down for trial
but apparently was ready for trial at the next jury term.
Requiring the plaintiff to proceed under those circumstances
in the court in which he had filed his action could hardly
be termed arbitrary. Certainly, no reason prejudicial
to his substantive rights was suggested for dismissal,
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The motion for voluntary dismissal made by MFT was not
made until the jury had been impaneled and the opening statements
had been made by the respective counsel for MFT - plaintiff-appellan
defendants and third-party defendant-respondent.
2.

Hardship as a result of expense and delay. Courts in

deciding a 41 (a) (2) motion may consider the expense invested
by the defendant in preparation for trial.

In Cincinnati

Traction

Building Company, v. Pullman Standard Car Manufacturer Company,
25 F. Supp. 332, (D. Del. 1938), the Delaware District Court held
that where depositions have been taken and where
Plaintiff has chosen the forum and has required defendant
to answer and prepare its defense at great expense,...
[the] defendant is entitled to have the controversy finally
adjudicated so that it may definitely know its rights.
Another district court in Roth v. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Company, 5

FRServ. 41 a.22 case 3 (S.D.

Ohio 1942)

reasoned as follows:
The defendant, by its counsel, has made affidavit that it
has expended the sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00)
in its defense of this suit. Under such circumstances
the court would abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's
motion for dismissal and relegating the defendant a few
dollars by way of cost. (Emphasis added)
The instant case, as alluded to by all parties in their
opening statements, involves a very complex set of facts including
a great deal of accounting minutia, the preparation of which
led to what counsel for the third party defendant-respondent
referred to as "almost unbelievable expense."

Furthermore, MFT,

by choosing a distant forum (St. George, Utah) imposed much additional expense on the defendant ( a resident of Salt Lake City).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i

Courts may also consider the potential hardship resulting
from a delay in resolving the issue presented by a case.
Federal District Court in California in
Corporation v. Petrol

A

Golconda Petroleum

Corporation, 46 F. Supp. 23, (S.D.

Cal. 194 2) argued that the granting of plaintiff's voluntary
motion for dismissal
Would result in an action being commenced in the State
Courts with considerable delay in deciding the issues.
This would create a hardship and courts are jealous
of avoiding such a result. (Citing cases) (Emphasis added)
Appellant in its third-party complaint alleged wrong doing by
respondent including conversion in excess of $10/000.00.

|

Defendant

was prepared at the time of trial to go forward, to meet the
allegations and to prove them to be false.

f

It would have been distinctly detrimental to respondent
to delay the opportunity to prove himself innocent of the serious
charges made by MFT.

f

The Washington County District Judge was also aware that
the sums involved were comparatively large, that the respondent
was a former loan officer at MFT who had lost his job and who
was at the time of the trial, working for his church.

•

To allow

a possible judgment for potentially large sums of money to
hang over the respondent's head undecided for an indefinite

'

period of time would work a significant hardship where the
respondent necessarily was already prepared, present in court,
and able to litigate the issues at a trial which had already begun.
The burden of uncertainty which granting of appellant's Motion
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

*

would have placed upon respondent defendant was itself sufficient
reason for exercise of discretion by the court below.
3,

Appellant declined to go forward.

at page 34, line 24
COURT:

The trial transcript

reveals the following dialogue:
You canf t go forward now is what you are

saying?
MR* FERRARI:

That is correct.

The Court after announcing that the case was dismissed
with prejudice stated its reason as follows:
... on the other hand the court inquired as to your
ability to go forward. This is the time set for trial.
You indicated you could not. That's the ruling of the
court, prepare appropriate pleadings. March 9, 1976,
Proceedings,p. 35, beginning at line 18. ( Emphasis
added)
In Shafer v. Evans, supra., the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the dismissal with prejudice by a district court
where the plaintiff had "declined to proceed" after his motion
for voluntary dismissal was denied.
In the instant case where grounds were apparent for the
denial of appellant's motion for voluntary dismissal and where
the appellant had manifested its unwillingness to proceed
on the merits, dismissal with prejudice was completely appropriate,
4,

The court's ruling was one of several reasonable

alternatives and the appellant failed to provide the court
with its now suggested alternative.

The appellant alleges

that the lower court abused its discretion by not choosing

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

to grant the appellant's motion for dismissal without prejudice
subject to the conditions that appellant would pay any additional
costs incurred by the respondent in an additional trial.

This

proposal made by the appellant is one of a number of
alternatives which the court could have chosen.
arguendo

Assuming

that the alternative suggested by the appellant

was the best alternative, it is still not an abuse of discretion for a court to fail to opt for the best of all possible
alternative courses of action.

To hold otherwise would be

a

i
holding that a court has no discretion in the matter at all.
The case of Alamance Industries Incorporated v. Filene's
291 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1961) is cited by Third Party plaintiffappellant for the proposition that courts when ruling on a 41(a)(2)
motion should "impose curative conditions."

In that case the

plaintiff had suggested to the trial court the conditions
upon which it should have dismissed the action.

Respondent

points out that the "curative conditions" upon which the Court
of Appeals held that case should have been dismissed, were in
the circuit court's opinion equivalent to dismissal with prejudice.
(291 F.2d 145).
5.

Appellant's suggested reason for inability to go forward

-

on the merits was not sufficiently compelling. Appellant suggests to
this court that it could not go forward on the merits because
it was not yet certain of its damage.

The damage issue was

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

g

only a fraction of the issues placed before the court by the
litigation between third party plaintiff-appellant m d third
party defendant-respondent.

Appellant was claiming in its

third party complaint that respondent had converted more than
$10,000.00 of its funds to his own use.

This claim was

in no way affected by the settlement between plaintiff and
defendants.

Also, the most difficult and complex issue of appellant

damage claim was that of liability.

Appellant gave the trial

Judge no reason whatsoever for not proceeding on these issues.
In addition, in almost any lawsuit, damages are not
liquidated in advance of trial to the exact penny.

Nevertheless,

a plaintiff is usually required to show damages as best he can
at the time of trial.

For example, in a personal injury action

the exact amount of damage cannot be determined until the plaintiff's death brings an end to medical bills, lost wages,

and pain.

It would be absurd to contend that because of this uncertainty
the claim in a personal injury case could not be litigated until
the plaintiff dies.
Further, appellant's ability to show its damage was not inhibit
by its settlement with the defendants-Benson, but was rather
improved by a significant narrowing of the issues involved.
Appellant could not have

known what its actual and exact damages

were when it first brought its claim against the third-party
defendant-respondent.

Its actual damages could not be determined

until the court decided liability and recovery as between
MFT and the Bensons, judgment was entered, and the judgment was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(

collected or written off as uncollectible.

There was no

<

guarantee that the Bensons were sufficiently solvent to cover
any judgment which may have been had against them, and an evaluation
of the Benson's ability to pay a judgment entered against them

i

would necessarily have involved the valuation and/or liquidation
of their primary asset, the apartment complex which appellant
accepted in settlement.

Thus, appellant, absent the settlement,

I

would have had to proceed through the entire trial and collection
proceedings before it would have any hope of showing

exactly what

damage, if any, it had suffered as a result of the third party

^

defendant-respondent's "alleged" wrong doing.
Appellant did not choose to wait until its damage was exactly
defined before it brought its claim against the respondent.

•'• *

Rather, it chose to involve the respondent in the litigation
of this issue, thus forcing the respondent to defend against
said claim and to face the same uncertainties as the appellant.
Respondent, at trial, was prepared to litigate all issues
raised by the third party plaintiff-appellant the day of the
trial.

Appellant's whining after the beginning of the trial, that

it could not proceed on the merits because it could not
determine with certainty what its actual damages were,
4

was inconsistent with the initiation of its claim against respondent in the first place. Therefore, appellant's argument
was not sufficiently compelling to be given significant weight
4

by the trial court.

For the Court to have considered appellant's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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f

explanation otherwise, would fly in the face of the notions
of justice and fair play.
CONCLUSION
Given the great expense respondent had incurred to prepare
for trial; the stage of trial proceedings at which time the
motion of appellant was made; the burden of uncertainty that
the respondent would have to bear, if the court ruled for
the appellant; and given the fact that appellant stated its
inability to proceed; the lower court's dismissal with prejudice was within the permissible bounds of discretion and
should be upheld.
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